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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 099667

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2033
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [GM](#) [LI](#) [KN](#) [SY](#)

SUBJECT: M/V ANTARES I: RESULTS OF COMPLIANT BOARDING

REF: A. BERLIN 915
[1](#)B. STATE 73774

Classified By: EUR/PRA Director Anita FRIEDT,
REASONS 1.4 (B), (C), AND (D)

BACKGROUND

[1](#)1. (S//REL Germany) On 13 June 2008, a boarding team from the USS Bulkeley boarded and searched the M/V ANTARES I, a Liberian-flagged, German-owned cargo vessel, on 13 June in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The boarding was conducted in accordance with our bilateral Proliferation Security Initiative Ship-Boarding Agreement (SBA) with Liberia. The vessel was suspected of carrying a cargo of North Korean-origin steel from China to Syria. The Syrian consignee for this cargo, Mechanical Construction Factory of Damascus, Syria, has procured for Syria's weapons development efforts in the past. For this reason, the USG decided to invoke the SBA in order to gather more information regarding the cargo.

When informed of the boarding, German officials requested a read-out of the boarding and analysis of the cargo.

ACTION REQUEST

[1](#)2. (S//REL Germany) Post is requested to approach appropriate host nation officials and provide a summary of the intelligence community's analysis of the information collected during the boarding. Post may draw from background, objectives, and talking points/non-paper below, as appropriate. Post also is authorized to provide photographs of the inspected

OBJECTIVES

[1](#)3. (S//REL Germany) Post should inform Germans that the consignee for the cargo is an entity in Syria of proliferation concern; however, analysis of available information indicates that it is unlikely the cargo could be used for WMD, delivery system, or weapons purposes.

TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER

[1](#)4. (S//REL Germany) Begin talking points/non-paper:

-- Analysis of the information and photographs from the 13 June 08 boarding of the M/V ANTARES I yielded the following:

-- The contract number on the crates confirmed that the consignee for the shipment was the Syrian Mechanical Construction Factory (MCF). The contract number did not provide cargo details, so the content of the crates is not known.

-- Analysis of the images of the metal pieces in the container determined that it is most likely scrap metal for reprocessing and as such is most likely not controlled and not the quality required for the production of WMD-related equipment or delivery systems.

POINT OF CONTACT

¶5. (U) Please contact Mark Felipe, ISN/CPI, 202-647-5376, felipem2@state.ic.gov, for follow-up information.

¶6. (U) Washington thanks post for its assistance. Please slug all responses for EUR, ISN, and T.
RICE

NNNN

End Cable Text